Kenya’s army commander Brigadier Joseph Ndolo and his 1971 Coup D’état attempt did raise eyebrows. This Kamba led revolution surprisingly involved the Chief Justice.
The fact that Ndolo would be often seen stroking a cat in his arms, he bore a character similar to Ernst Stavro Blofeld the supervillain in James Bond Movies.

Anyway, in the early 1971, an Africa-wide wave of military coups finally reached East Africa.
But the real trouble started in Uganda.
On 25 January 1971, while Ugandan President Milton Obote was flying home from a Commonwealth summit, army commander Idi Amin seized control of the country.
Although the genesis of events was domestic, international politics played a role.
Britain was one of the first countries to recognise Amin’s government, delighted at Obote’s exit, and the Kenyans were also satisfied that he was gone.
Obote landed in Kenya and claimed political asylum, but Kenyatta refused, on the advice of Njonjo and McKenzie.
In contrast, Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere did give Obote asylum and refused to recognise Amin, making the coup a critical event in the disintegration of the East African Community.
Within months, Kenya too was in difficulties.
The likelihood of a military coup in Kenya had been growing since 1969, with senior army officers, including army commander Brigadier Joseph Ndolo, musing on the country’s future.
By March 1971, Ndolo’s opinions had come to the attention of the British Military Intelligence, who discussed the mechanics of a possible attempt in detail:
‘In February and March, Ndolo discussed the situation in Kenya with a number of people in terms which clearly indicated that he thought that he would have to mount an Army coup on Kenyatta’s death if not before.’
The British took Ndolo seriously, believing that there was ‘a real possibility of an attempt at an Army coup within the next eighteen months or so’.
They concluded that it would not significantly harm British interests, but that Britain would be better served by the survival of the existing regime.
They therefore continued to provide discreet advice to make a coup less likely, while further tightening links with the army.
The coup plot​, exposed between March and May 1971​, was only loosely related to the musings of Ndolo, and the true story has never been told.
What emerged from the plotters’ confessions was a poorly structured Luo–Kamba plot, inspired in part by the events of 1969.
It appeared naive and the plotters’ testimony is confusing and sometimes incredible.
The formal plot, which was led by Joseph Owino, a Luo soldier who had also been implicated in the 1964 mutiny, probably began in September 1970.
In February 1971, the plotters recruited a more senior Luo, university professor Ouma Muga.
In early 1971, Muga led a delegation to Nyerere to ask for money and weapons for a coup, and for a Tanzanian mobilisation
Nyerere refused and arrested some of the conspirators.
Soon after, Kenyan military intelligence learnt of the plot, possibly through Nyerere himself.
On 24 March 1971, Kenyatta ordered the army to return the extra ammunition issued during the Uganda coup.
By May, several soldiers were under arrest.
Twelve men, including air force and other officers, were charged with sedition (rather than the capital crime of treason), and were jailed for between six and nine years. All pleaded guilty, having been denied access to legal representation.
There were later reports that some were tortured.
During the trials, the names of more senior figures emerged, linking the plotters first to ​the Member of Parliament Gideon Mutiso and then to Chief Justice Kitili Mwendwa and Ndolo, all Kamba.
Mutiso later admitted that he had been involved and was to become ‘Chairman of the Revolutionary Council’. He too was jailed for nine years in June after a mock trial presaging those of the 1980s, in which he pleaded guilty and implicated Ndolo.
The Kamba Major, head of the new Strike master air force unit was detained without trial, as was a Kamba businessman said to have been the intermediary between Ndolo and Mutiso. The plotters’ motives appeared to include anger at the ‘Kikuyu-nisation’ of Kenya and the oath of 1969.
The coup plot had Odinga the head of state and Ndolo as his deputy
How much the senior Kamba officers actually knew of the Owino plot remains unknown.
However, but by early June it seemed that President Kenyatta, his Kikuyu security advisers (Njonjo, Geoffrey Kariithi, Police Chief Bernard Hinga, intelligence chief James Kanyotu, Koinange, Jeremiah Kiereini and Ben Gethi) and Vice President Daniel Moi had decided that both Ndolo and Mwendwa must go and used the trials to implicate them.
Jomo Kenyatta considered ordering Ndolo’s arrest, but was persuaded that to do so might precipitate the crisis he was trying to avoid.
Instead, Ndolo was called to State House, informed by Kenyatta that his disloyalty had been discovered, and asked to retire, with a promise of no reprisals against him if he acquiesced.