Rebel forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are currently controlling a population of nearly 5 million, in Goma, Bukavu, South Kivu and Uvira.
Following their taking of Goma, a city with a population of more than 2 million and Bukavu with over 1.3 million residents, the respective capitals of North and South Kivu Provinces, the M23 rebels are pressing further south.
In capturing Kamanyola on their way to Uvira, they took control of a population of 650,000, in the third largest city in the Kivus.
With another prong moving North of Goma toward Butembo, a population of 290,000 residents has also been brought under rebels’ command.
Ugandan forces have meanwhile also entered the DR Congo and seized Bunia with a population of 900,000, the capital of Ituri Province.
A call for a pause in the fighting by leaders from the 8 member states of the East African Community (EAC) and 16 member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was dismissed by the March 23 rebel forces, who have continued their offensive to seize more territory in the eastern DRC.
With the prospect of the M23 controlling the entirety of the 124,000 square kilometers of the mineral-rich Kivus, if indeed Rwanda is backing the rebels, then Kigali would effectively be gaining a territory nearly five times its size.
Tensions have already started surfacing in Kisangani (in north central DRC) and Lubumbashi (in the south of the country) following the M23’s threats to push all the way to Kinshasa.
Reports from DR Congo indicate that the Forces Armée de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) are not providing much resistance to M23 advances.
Burundian forces, numbering around 10,000 in South Kivu, have reportedly started withdrawing after M23 rebels overran Kavumu Airport and the adjacent air force base on their way to Bukavu.
The proximity of the fighting to Bujumbura, just across the DR Congo border, risks leading to a direct confrontation between Burundi and Rwanda troops.
The aim of the Ugandan deployment is ostensibly to counter the wantonly violent criminal group, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which has been menacing communities on both sides of the Ugandan-DRC border for years.
However, the M23’s simultaneous drive towards Butembo enroute to Bunia has raised suspicions of potential coordination between the M23, Rwanda, and Uganda.
Top Ugandan generals and senior government advisors have commented favorably on the M23’s cause and narrative, a markedly different tone than when the M23 seized Goma back in 2012.
During the battle for Goma in January 2025, a firefight between the M23 and SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) forces, who were in the DRC to help contain the M23 threat, led to the deaths of 20 soldiers from South Africa, Malawi, and Tanzania.
About 1,300 SAMIDRC troops remain confined to their bases in Goma and Sake under the watch of M23 fighters after negotiating a ceasefire.
The deaths and the potential of Rwanda gaining leverage over its giant neighbor have further accentuated the regional tensions underlying this conflict.
The DRC’s already dire humanitarian situation has been worsened with the population displacements caused by M23 advances.
More than 500,000 people in the Kivus were displaced as a result of the M23’s latest push. There are now an estimated 7 million Congolese displaced within the country, the majority in the eastern provinces.
The United Nations (UN) estimates that 3,000 people, mostly civilians, were killed during the M23’s attack on Goma, underlying the degree of violence employed. Many say the death toll is much higher.
The risk of mass atrocities is also high in a region where predation by rebels, militias, and government forces is common. The UN has warned of surging child recruitment, abductions, killings, and sexual violence.
As the fighting expands, these human costs as well as wider instability for the entire region are likely to escalate.
The First and Second Congo Wars are estimated to have resulted in the deaths of 5.4 million people and economic costs in the DRC alone of more than USD 11 billion (or 29 percent of its GDP at the time).
A Regionalized Crisis
The M23 is advancing faster than previous insurgencies from the east during the First (1996–1997) and Second Congo Wars (1998–2003), with the possibility that they could attempt to march on Kinshasa.
A ceasefire may require the deployment of a multinational AU observer force composed of countries acceptable to all belligerents.
A ceasefire would need to be supported by the resumption and merging of the Luanda and Nairobi negotiating processes to realize a longer-term resolution.
This would entail a verifiable agreement between the DRC and Rwanda, backed by a joint commission to monitor commitments.
This could be modelled after the South African-mediated Pretoria Agreement in 2002 that paved the way for Rwanda’s exit from the DRC and a mechanism for joint operations with the Congolese government to address the FDLR.
Lessons, too, can be drawn from the 1999 Lusaka Agreement, which orchestrated the cessation of hostilities from the First Congo War, including a process for the orderly withdrawal of external actors and a mechanism to pursue disarmament and reintegration of former combatants into the Congolese military.
A multinational African guarantor mechanism with international backing would likely be a critical element of such an agreement to provide assurances to all sides that commitments are being upheld.
The solutions to the DRC’s complex problems are to be found within the Congolese experience but must be backed up by African support and engagement to be realized—and to avert the enormous costs to the continent generated by previous conflicts in the DRC.