How the War in Uganda melted animosity between Presidents of Kenya and Tanzania in March 1979

It happened around this time, 46 years ago.

Kenya and Tanzania happen to be neighbours, but since the early 1960s, when the two countries gained independence, there were some sort of cold rivalry and animosity between Dar and Nairobi.

Some observers believed the hostility was influenced by jealousies. 

The estrangement was clearly seen during the 1978-79 Tanzanian invasion of Uganda to overthrow Idd Amin.

The Ugandan Dictator had previously attacked Tanzania attempting to slice Kagera into his precinct.

During that time however, Presidents Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya were also not on talking terms.

In fact, Moi’s government was clearly against the war in Uganda. 

The most surprising thing was that as the Tanzanian forces supported by Ugandan rebels marched towards Kampala, Nyerere who was desperately seeking Kenya’s cooperation had to send a message to President Moi through the US Department of State in Washington.  

Imagine presidents of two neighbourly countries couldn’t even call each other directly to discuss the situation of such a magnitude. 

This was after Amin’s forces scored a slight victory against the invading forces at Tororo in March 1979. 

Excited by this new development, Amin called his friend Muammar Gaddafi and Yasser Arafat to send him fighters so that he could make another counter offensive. 

Libya and Palestine supported the Ugandan attacks on Tanzania

As a result of this request on March 9, 1979, Gaddafi sent to Uganda 1000, soldiers, while Yasser Arafat sent 40 guerilla fighters from the Fatah to join 400 Palestinian fighters who were already fighting in the country.

The Libyan fighting force brought with it 15 T-55 tanks, 12 armoured personnel carriers, and Land Rovers equipped with 106 mm (4.2 in) recoilless rifles and 12 Katyusha rocket launchers.

Worried about this new development on March 10, 1979, Nyerere summoned James Spain, the US Ambassador in Dar, and asked him whether the United States could convince Kenya to help in the Uganda situation.

Spain promised that he would pass on his request to the US State Department in Washington. 

The US State Department, upon receiving the request from Dar, agreed to approach Moi on behalf of Nyerere but through their ambassador in Nairobi Wilbert J. Le Melle.  

However, before entrusting Le Melle with the task of approaching Moi, there were issues that the Department wanted Spain, the ambassador in Dar, to make clear to Nyerere, especially about the message that was to be delivered to Moi.

First was that they were not prepared to raise with Moi all the issues Nyerere had identified for discussion or to ascertain whether Arao Moi would cooperate in the manner that Mwalimu Nyerere desired.

However, they were willing to tell Moi that Nyerere wanted to discuss the Ugandan situation but also make it clear to him that the American government was not involved in ‘anything that Nyerere may propose in this discussion.’

The draft of the key points that were to influence the US’s conversation with Moi was also sent to Nyerere for his perusal and for him to suggest any modifications. 

First before presenting the draft, Spain was to tell Nyerere:

“We have queried our Embassy in Nairobi concerning your request, and our ambassador believes he can make an approach to Moi on your behalf.”

He would then present the draft by telling Nyerere:

“We believe the approach to Moi should be limited as follows: 

“President Nyerere told Ambassador Spain in Dar es Salaam that he believes it would be useful to have a discreet discussion with you on ways in which your two governments might cooperate to resolve the Uganda situation.

“—Nyerere asked Spain if the United States would be willing to relay this message in the interest of bringing an early end to the Tanzania-Uganda conflict.

“—We agreed to do so for that reason, but as you are aware, we have tried not to become involved in this dispute and have hoped that an African solution could be reached.

“—Further, we are merely seeking in this matter to assist communication between two of our friends; we do not have, nor do we seek, any relationship to or involvement in the topics to be discussed.

“—If you desire to talk to Nyerere about Uganda, we assume you will wish to arrange that through your own channels. If you desire, we will also advise Ambassador Spain to tell President Nyerere that you are interested in talking with Nyerere about Uganda and will welcome a direct communication from him.

“—We feel strongly that events going on in East Africa and communication between African leaders is an African matter in which we do not believe we can appropriately be involved.”

After presenting this draft , Spain told Nyerere, “If this limited approach to Moi  is satisfactory to you, we will proceed with it promptly”.

Nyerere agreed, and Ambassador Le Melle in Nairobi was given the green light to approach Moi using the draft as guidance. 

Wilbert Le Melle met Moi on April 3, 1979. 

Before he left for State House, President Jimmy Carter sent him a Telegram telling him to also tell Moi not to allow Libyan war material to transit Kenya.

This message was to be orally. Libyan military hardware transiting through Kenya was actually Nyerere’s greatest fear. The meeting went well, with Moi telling Le Melle to assure Carter that “he would do what he could do.”

That same day, Moi banned the airlift of petroleum to Uganda and the refuelling of Libyan aircraft to and from Uganda in Kenya.

On that same day, Moi had a telephone conversation with Nyerere after a very long time. 

On April 4, 1979, Nyerere summoned Ambassador James Spain and told him to thank  President Carter.  The Tanzanian leader told the diplomat that he credited Carter’s message to Moi for the increased cooperation Moi pledged during their telephone conversation. 

Describing his conversation with Moi as productive,  Nyerere also said that he would try to alleviate some of the issues Moi had raised with him  during the phone call, especially on the question of Obote finding his way to power after  the overthrow of Amin and “imposing his will on Ugandans.”

Nyerere once again thanked the diplomat, telling him that he would find time to personally thank President Jimmy Carter.  

All this was happening as Tanzanian soldiers and Ugandan rebels launched a major assault on Kampala, killing many Libyan and Palestinian fighters, and eventually captured the city on April 10, 1979, as Amin fled.